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SMITH, Chief Judge.
In 2015, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Daniel
Golden and publicist Tracy Locke were conducting research
for Golden’s then-forthcoming book, Spy Schools: How the
CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s
Universities.1 As part of that research, Golden and Locke
invoked open records laws to request documents from public
universities. From April to August of 2015, Golden and Locke
submitted three records requests to the New Jersey Institute of
Technology (“NJIT”) under New Jersey’s Open Public
Records Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1A-1–47:1A-13 (“OPRA”).
Many of NJIT’s documents that were responsive to the OPRA
requests originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI” or “the Bureau”) and were subject to prohibitions on
public dissemination. NJIT’s custodian of records, Clara
Williams, therefore asked the FBI to advise NJIT as to whether
it should allow access to the records. In no uncertain terms, the
FBI directed NJIT to withhold most of the records. NJIT
obliged, claiming that the documents were exempt from
disclosure. This lawsuit followed.
After removal of this case to federal court, NJIT and the
FBI agreed to reexamine the previously withheld records. As
a result of that review, NJIT produced thousands of pages of
documents it had formerly deemed exempt. Golden and Locke
then moved for attorneys’ fees under OPRA, which mandates
Golden’s book was published by Henry Holt and Co.
in October 2017. At the time of the events in this case, Locke
was a publicist with Henry Holt and Co.
1
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a fee award for prevailing plaintiffs. See N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 47:1A-6. The District Court denied the fee motion, holding
that no nexus existed between the lawsuit filed by Golden and
Locke and the eventual release of records. The Court was
persuaded by NJIT’s position that it had acted reasonably in
following the FBI’s direction.
We disagree with both the District Court’s conclusion
and its misplaced focus on reasonableness. Under the catalyst
theory, as adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees if there exists “a factual
causal nexus between [the] litigation and the relief ultimately
achieved” and if “the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had
a basis in law.” Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017,
1032 (N.J. 2008) (quoting Singer v. State, 472 A.2d 138, 142
(N.J. 1984)). Before Golden and Locke filed suit, NJIT had
asserted OPRA exemptions to justify withholding the majority
of the requested records. Post-lawsuit, NJIT abandoned its
reliance on those exemptions and produced most of the
records. Golden and Locke’s lawsuit was the catalyst for the
production of documents and thereby satisfied the Mason test.
That NJIT withheld records at the behest of the FBI does not
afford it a basis to abdicate its role as the records custodian.
NJIT alone bore the burden of allowing or denying access to
the requested records. With that burden comes the attendant
responsibility of paying attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
We will therefore reverse and remand for the calculation of
attorneys’ fees.

4

I.
A.
Enacted in 2002, the purpose of OPRA is “to maximize
public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an
informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a
secluded process.” Id. at 1025 (quoting Asbury Park Press v.
Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 864 A.2d 446, 458 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004)). To effectuate that purpose, OPRA
outlines a procedure to ensure that “government records shall
be readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination
by the citizens of [New Jersey.]”2 Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 47:1A-1). And OPRA requires every “[p]ublic agency,”
including NJIT, to designate a records custodian. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 47:1A-1.1. A records custodian is, as relevant here,
“the officer officially designated by formal action of [the]
agency’s director or governing body.” Id.
A person seeking government records must submit to
the records custodian a written request for access that is “handdelivered, mailed, transmitted electronically, or otherwise
A “[g]overnment record” is broadly defined as “any
paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan,
photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed
document, information stored or maintained electronically or
by sound-recording or in a similar device, or any copy thereof.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1.1. “Government record” includes
both records that an agency “made, maintained or kept on file
in the course of . . . its official business,” and those that have
“been received in the course of . . . official business.” Id.
5
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conveyed.” Id. § 47:1A-5(g). Once that request is made, the
custodian “shall permit the record to be inspected, examined,
and copied by any person during regular business hours” unless
the record is exempt from access.3 Id. § 47:1A-5(a). The
agency may charge a nominal fee for the cost of duplicating
records, id. § 47:1A-5(b)(1), as well as a special service charge
for requests that “involv[e] an extraordinary expenditure of
time and effort,” id. § 47:1A-5(c).
Absent any applicable exemptions,4 the records
custodian must generally disclose government records no later

3

The hours during which the records custodian must
make records available are abbreviated for smaller public
agencies. See id. § 47:1A-5(a).
4
Under OPRA, exemptions may be contained within
OPRA itself, and also incorporated in resolutions of the New
Jersey Legislature, Executive Orders, federal laws or
regulations, or federal orders. Id. § 47:1A-5(a). Exemptions
are construed narrowly. See id. § 47:1A-1 (declaring it to be
the public policy of New Jersey that any limitations on the right
of access accorded by OPRA “shall be construed in favor of
the public’s right of access”).
If the records custodian deems part of a record to be
exempt, she must delete or redact that portion and permit
access to the remainder of the record. Id. § 47:1A-5(g). Before
turning over responsive records, the records custodian also
redacts certain personal information, including social security
numbers, credit card numbers, and drivers’ license numbers.
Id. § 47:1A-5(a).
6

than seven business days after receiving the request.5 Id.
§ 47:1A-5(i). If the custodian cannot comply with the request,
she must “indicate the specific basis therefor on the request
form and promptly return it to the requestor.” Id. § 47:1A-5(g).
In the event a request for access “would substantially disrupt
agency operations,” the custodian must “attempt[] to reach a
reasonable solution with the requestor that accommodates the
interests of the requestor and the agency” before denying
access. Id. If the custodian fails to respond to a request within
seven business days, she is deemed to have denied the request.
Id. § 47:1A-5(i).
If the records custodian denies access to a government
record, the requestor has two options: file a lawsuit in the New
Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, or a complaint with the
Government Records Council. Id. § 47:1A-6. Either action
“shall proceed in a summary or expedited manner,” with the
public agency bearing “the burden of proving that the denial of
access is authorized by law.” Id.
“OPRA provides for attorney’s fees and civil penalties
in certain circumstances.” Mason, 951 A.2d at 1026. “A
requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a
reasonable attorney’s fee.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-6.
Moreover, if a records custodian “knowingly and willfully
5

Certain records, including budgets, bills, vouchers,
and contracts, are required to be provided immediately upon
request. Id. § 47:1A-5(e). If a record is in storage or archived,
the custodian must so notify the requestor within seven days
and arrange to retrieve the record promptly. Id. §§ 47:1A-5(g),
(i).
7

violates [OPRA] . . . and is found to have unreasonably denied
access under the totality of the circumstances,” she is subject
to a range of civil penalties, as well as appropriate disciplinary
action. Id. § 47:1A-11(a).
B.
In 2015, Golden and Locke were conducting research
for a book Golden was writing that would examine foreign and
domestic intelligence activities at United States universities.
On April 8, 2015, Golden submitted the first OPRA request to
Williams, NJIT’s records custodian. The first request sought
(1)

“all e-mail communications since January
1, 2010, between the Central Intelligence
Agency or its representatives using the
email domains @ucia.gov, @cia.gov, or
any other address, and the following
people at the New Jersey Institute of
Technology: the president, chancellor(s),
provost(s),
vice
provost(s),
vice
presidents, deans, general counsel,
assistant general counsel, outside counsel,
and campus police chief”; and

(2)

“all e-mail communications since
January 1, 2010, between the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or its
representatives using the email domains
@ic.fbi.gov, @fbi.gov, or any other email
address, and the same people at NJIT.”
8

App. 58. NJIT staff accessed the computer system to search
for the email extensions contained in Golden’s request. NJIT
located over 1,400 emails, which Williams began to review and
print. Due to the volume of emails, Williams asked for and
received from Golden an extension of the seven-day OPRA
deadline to turn over records covered by the request.
During Williams’s review, she discovered that many of
the emails—which were mostly from the FBI to NJIT—
contained dissemination controls.6 For example, some emails
warned, “do not disclose,” or “proprietary and confidential
information.” App. 213, ¶ 27. Williams believed that these
emails likely fell within OPRA’s exemption for third-party
confidential information, and she notified the FBI of the first
request and the responsive emails. In turn, the FBI told
Williams that it would need to review all of the emails before
she disclosed them to Golden.
In May 2015, FBI agents visited NJIT to review the
emails Williams had compiled. The FBI advised Williams
“that any emails directed to and received from the FBI are
deemed FBI records and, as such, are the property of the United
States Government.” App. 214, ¶ 31. The FBI also told
Williams that it, not NJIT, “is cloaked with full and exclusive
authority to determine whether or not any such email is subject
to disclosure.” App. 214, ¶ 31. The FBI redacted some emails
and marked others as classified. The FBI instructed Williams
to produce certain records and to withhold others.

NJIT’s search failed to turn up any responsive records
relating to the CIA.
9
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On May 29, 2015, Williams responded to Golden’s first
request. NJIT produced approximately 540 pages of records,
many of which were redacted. NJIT also withheld 3,949 pages,
citing several OPRA exemptions. See App. 61–62 (citing,
inter alia, exemptions for domestic security and documents
that would be exempt under federal law, including the federal
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)). Williams’s response
included a letter from the FBI memorializing its directive to
withhold the records.
Approximately two months later, on July 28, 2015,
Locke submitted to NJIT a second OPRA request, which was
identical to the first request. The following day, Williams
contacted the FBI to advise it of the second request and to
confirm her understanding that NJIT was prohibited from
releasing any additional records. Williams then denied
Locke’s request; citing many of the same OPRA exemptions
as before, Williams advised that NJIT would not produce any
additional records and enclosed the FBI’s May 2015 letter
prohibiting disclosure.
Just a few weeks later, on August 13, 2015, Golden
submitted a third OPRA request. The third request mirrored
the first and second requests. Noticing this duplication,
Williams asked Golden if he had submitted the request in error;
he responded that the third request was broader than the first
two because it sought records through the date of the most
recent request. After again consulting with the FBI, Williams
denied the third request pursuant to the same OPRA
exemptions and enclosed the FBI’s May 2015 letter.

10

C.
Roughly a month later, in September 2015, Golden and
Locke sued NJIT and Williams under OPRA and New Jersey’s
common law right of access in the Superior Court of New
Jersey Law Division, Essex County.7 The Court issued a show
cause order to NJIT.8 Although the FBI initially told NJIT it
would intervene in the lawsuit, the Bureau opted not to do so.
As a result, NJIT filed a third-party complaint against the FBI
for indemnification in the event the Court awarded Golden and
Locke attorneys’ fees.
In December 2015, the FBI removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The FBI counterclaimed
against NJIT, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent NJIT from releasing responsive records to Golden and
Locke. The Court stayed all discovery in the case pending a
status conference.
Beginning in January 2016, the Magistrate Judge to
whom the case was referred held a series of status conferences
with the parties. As of February 2016, NJIT and the FBI
Golden’s common law right of access claim is not at
issue in this appeal.
8
In early December 2015, following oral argument on
the order to show cause, Judge Stephanie A. Mitterhoff ruled
that the case was not yet ready for adjudication because the FBI
needed additional time to review documents. Judge Mitterhoff
ordered the FBI to start reviewing documents immediately.
7

11

possessed approximately 6,000 pages of undisclosed
documents responsive to the OPRA requests. Of the 6,000
pages, the Bureau claimed that 4,000 were federal records that
were purportedly exempt from disclosure under OPRA. The
FBI agreed to treat the remaining 2,000 pages as a request from
NJIT to consult, and the Bureau would review the documents
at a rate of 500 pages per month. Although Golden and Locke
did not agree with the FBI’s position as to the 4,000
purportedly exempt pages, all parties agreed to the consultation
procedure. Given the progress, the Magistrate Judge stayed the
case.
In June 2016, the FBI reported that it had reviewed
approximately 2,000 pages of responsive records. The FBI
redacted and returned the documents to NJIT, “which in turn
produced the redacted documents to Plaintiffs in accordance
with FBI protocols for consultation requests.” App. 143. The
FBI also undertook “a further cursory review” of the remaining
purportedly exempt pages and agreed to review them at a rate
of 500 pages per month. App. 143.
In October 2016, the FBI finished its review of the 6,000
pages. NJIT produced 3,445 unredacted pages and 379
partially redacted pages.9 NJIT withheld 26 pages pursuant to
a FOIA exemption and 1,614 pages because the FBI asserted
control over those documents. The Bureau agreed to provide
Golden and Locke with additional information concerning the
withheld documents in an effort to narrow the issues for
judicial review.

9

Approximately 362 pages were duplicates.
12

In January 2017, the parties reported that they had
“made substantial progress in narrowing the issues to be
litigated.” App. 151. Golden and Locke agreed not to
challenge a substantial number of the withheld documents.
They also provided NJIT and the FBI with a list of specific
withheld documents that they wanted the Bureau to revisit. In
February 2017, the FBI produced additional records. In light
of upcoming publication deadlines for Golden’s book, he and
Locke opted not to challenge the remainder of the withheld
documents. The parties advised the Magistrate Judge that the
only issue that remained to be resolved was Golden and
Locke’s forthcoming motion for attorneys’ fees as prevailing
parties under OPRA.
Golden and Locke filed a motion for attorneys’ fees in
November 2017, seeking $197,829.50. NJIT opposed the
motion. In April 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the
District Court deny the fee motion. The Magistrate Judge
believed that no causal nexus existed between Golden and
Locke’s lawsuit and the production of records. The Magistrate
Judge reasoned that because the FBI—not NJIT—asserted and
then abandoned OPRA exemptions, NJIT’s conduct was
“unaffected and unchanged” by the filing of the lawsuit. App.
23. The Magistrate Judge also ruled that NJIT’s conduct was
reasonable. Golden and Locke objected to the R&R.
On August 2, 2018, the District Court adopted the R&R
and denied Golden and Locke’s fee motion. Like the
Magistrate Judge, the District Court considered NJIT’s
conduct to be “reasonable in light of the FBI’s repeated
demand that NJIT not release records without its approval,
13

NJIT’s consistent position to Plaintiffs that it would not do so,
and its attempts to facilitate a resolution for Plaintiffs.” App.
7. The District Court also agreed with the Magistrate Judge
that, while the FBI’s conduct had changed because of the
lawsuit, NJIT had not altered its position.
Golden and Locke timely appealed.
II.
Neither of the parties questioned the District Court’s
jurisdiction, nor did the Court raise the issue sua sponte. We,
however, must fulfill our “independent obligation” to ensure
that jurisdiction exists.10 N.J. Carpenters and Trs. Thereof v.
Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The FBI removed
this case under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1). The “central aim” of the federal officer removal
statute “is [to] protect[] officers of the federal government from
interference by litigation in state court while those officers are
trying to carry out their duties.” Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co.,
Inc., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2016). To achieve that end,
“the federal officer removal statute is to be broadly construed
in favor of a federal forum.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Four requirements must be satisfied before a district
court may assert jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1): (1) “the
“We review de novo whether the District Court had
subject matter jurisdiction.” In re Commonwealth’s Motion to
Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila.,
790 F.3d 457, 465 (3d Cir. 2015).
14
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defendant is a person within the meaning of the statute”; (2)
“the plaintiff’s claims are based upon the defendant’s conduct
acting under the United States, its agencies, or its officers”; (3)
“the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant are for, or relating
to an act under color of federal office”; and (4) “the defendant
raises a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff’s claims.” Id.
at 812 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The FBI’s notice of removal cites only the applicable
statute, § 1442(a)(1), and concludes that the action is
removable “because it involves a civil action against the FBI—
an agency of the United States.” Notice of Removal at 3, ¶ 8,
Golden v. N.J. Inst. of Tech., No. 2:15-cv-08559 (D.N.J. Dec.
11, 2015), ECF No. 1. Although the notice of removal is
facially inadequate,11 we conclude after independently
reviewing the record that the four requirements for jurisdiction
are easily satisfied here.
The FBI is a federal agency, which fulfills the first
requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (permitting “[t]he
United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any
person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any
agency thereof” to remove a case under § 1442(a)(1)).
The second requirement, that NJIT’s claims be based
upon the FBI’s “conduct acting under the United States, its
agencies, or its officers,” is “liberally construed to cover
actions that involve an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the
11

See id. at 466 (instructing that the notice of removal
“must allege the underlying facts supporting each of the
requirements for removal jurisdiction”).
15

federal supervisor’s duties or tasks.” Papp, 842 F.3d at 812
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). This
requirement is also easily met here. For example, the FBI
alleges that it directed NJIT to withhold certain records that
“contain critical intelligence to detect and prevent violent
crime and terrorism in the United States before such acts
occur.” App. 132, ¶ 60. Clearly, the FBI’s conduct—directing
NJIT to withhold such records—was “assisting,” or helping to
effectuate, “the duties or tasks” of the United States, to wit,
protecting citizens from crime and terrorism.
In re
Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or
Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 468 (3d Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The FBI was thus
“acting under” the United States.
The third requirement is that “the plaintiff’s claims
against the defendant [be] for, or relating to an act under color
of federal office.” Papp, 842 F.3d at 812 (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted). To meet this requirement,
“it is sufficient for there to be a ‘connection’ or ‘association’
between the act in question and the federal office.” Def. Ass’n,
790 F.3d at 471. Here, the FBI asserted that certain of NJIT’s
documents were property of the United States and demanded
that NJIT withhold those documents to protect the United
States’ confidentiality interests. See App. 100, ¶ 8 (third-party
complaint, alleging that the FBI sought withholding of certain
records because “the information is law enforcement sensitive
and may implicate criminal and/or national security interests”).
The FBI has thereby set forth a “connection or association”
between the Bureau’s actions and the United States, and the

16

acts at issue thus satisfy the “under color of federal office”
requirement.
Finally, jurisdiction can exist under § 1442(a)(1) only if
“the defendant raises a colorable federal defense to the
plaintiff’s claims.” Papp, 842 F.3d at 812 (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of federal
officer removal jurisdiction, a defense is “colorable” if it is
“legitimate and [can] reasonably be asserted, given the facts
presented and the current law.” Id. at 815; see also Jefferson
Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (rejecting “a narrow,
grudging interpretation” of § 1442(a)’s colorable federal
defense requirement). The FBI raises several defenses to
NJIT’s claims, but it is sufficient for our purposes to focus on
just one—that the disputed records are “federal records” not
subject to OPRA.12
The FBI alleges that the disputed records are federal
records within the meaning of 44 U.S.C. § 3301 and that, as
such, these records are not subject to OPRA and cannot be
disclosed to Golden and Locke under that statute. In other
words, the FBI argues that its status as a federal agency and the
resulting status of the records as federal records precludes
enforcement of state law. This defense is similar to other
colorable federal defenses centering on potential state
interference with a federal agency. See, e.g., Def. Ass’n, 790
12

The FBI also raises two other potential federal
defenses—that portions of the disputed records are exempt
from disclosure under the Privacy Act of 1974 and FOIA. We
need not decide whether these defenses qualify as colorable
federal defenses under § 1442(a)(1).
17

F.3d at 474 (explaining that the defendant had raised a
colorable federal defense by claiming that the Commonwealth
was preempted, under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 347–48 (2001), from interfering in
the defendant’s relationship with a federal agency); see also
Acker, 527 U.S. at 431 (holding that the defendants had raised
a colorable federal defense by alleging that a state tax
interfered with the operation of the federal judiciary, in
violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine). We
need not, and do not, pass on the merits of the FBI’s defense.
For jurisdictional purposes, it is sufficient that the FBI has
raised a colorable federal defense under § 1442(a)(1). See
Papp, 842 F.3d at 815 (“A defendant need not win his case
before he can have it removed.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We are satisfied that the four prerequisites for
§ 1442(a)(1) jurisdiction are met.13
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1367, and we exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The FBI’s status as a third-party defendant does not
affect our conclusion that jurisdiction exists; third-party
defendants may remove under § 1442(a)(1). See, e.g., Johnson
v. Showers, 747 F.2d 1228, 1229 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The fact that
the Director is a third-party defendant does not defeat removal
under section 1442(a)(1).”); IMFC Prof’l Servs. of Fla., Inc. v.
Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1982)
(same).
18
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III.
On appeal, Golden and Locke argue that, as prevailing
plaintiffs, they are entitled to a mandatory award of attorneys’
fees under OPRA.14 As they see it, the calculus is simple: presuit, NJIT withheld thousands of pages of records pursuant to
OPRA exemptions, only to abandon its resort to those
exemptions by releasing the records after the lawsuit was filed.
As NJIT would have it, the analysis is not quite so
straightforward because the FBI was directing NJIT to
withhold the records. That directive, NJIT contends, renders
its actions reasonable and permissible under OPRA.
A.
Under OPRA, “[a] requestor who prevails in any
proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-6; see Teeters v. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs., 904 A.2d 747, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006) (describing OPRA’s “shall be entitled” language as
“mandatory”). A requestor is a so-called “prevailing party if
he or she achieves the desired result because the complaint
brought about change (voluntary or otherwise) in the
custodian’s conduct.” Spectraserv, Inc. v. Middlesex Cty.
Utils. Auth., 7 A.3d 231, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

14

We exercise plenary review over whether a party is a
“prevailing party” under OPRA for purposes of attorneys’ fee
awards. See Addie v. Kjaer, 836 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2016).
19

An OPRA requestor need not secure a judicial order
compelling the release of records to be entitled to attorneys’
fees. Rather, under the catalyst theory adopted by New Jersey
courts, “prevailing plaintiffs” may attain attorneys’ fees when,
like Golden and Locke, they obtain records “when a
government agency voluntarily discloses [them] after a lawsuit
is filed.” Mason, 951 A.2d at 1021. Such plaintiffs are entitled
to fees if they can demonstrate (1) “a factual causal nexus
between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief ultimately
achieved”; and (2) that “the relief ultimately secured by
plaintiffs had a basis in law.”15 Id. at 1032. This assessment
is fact-sensitive and evaluates “the reasonableness of, and
motivations for, an agency’s decisions.” Id. at 1033. The
dispute in this case centers on the first prong—whether there
exists a factual causal nexus between Golden and Locke’s
lawsuit and the release of the disputed records, as both parties
have conceded the second prong is met.
Golden and Locke have proven a factual causal nexus
between their lawsuit and the release of records. Before the
lawsuit, NJIT refused to release the majority of documents
responsive to the first OPRA request and completely denied
the second and third requests. After Golden and Locke filed
suit, NJIT agreed to the FBI’s consultation procedure and
subsequently released 3,445 unredacted pages and 379
partially redacted pages. By releasing these previously
15

Although, as in this case, the requestor generally
bears the burden of establishing the Mason factors, the burden
shifts to the agency if it fails to respond to an OPRA request
within seven days. Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017,
1032 (N.J. 2008).
20

withheld records, NJIT abandoned any reliance on the OPRA
exemptions it had formerly asserted. There is no indication in
the record that NJIT would have produced the previously
withheld documents absent Golden and Locke’s lawsuit. On
the contrary, NJIT allowed access to the records only after a
lengthy, cooperative process overseen by the Magistrate Judge.
It is clear, then, that Golden and Locke’s lawsuit was the
catalyst for the release of records.
B.
That NJIT chose to rely upon the FBI’s directives does
not change our conclusion. As discussed supra, the catalyst
theory focuses on whether there exists “a factual causal nexus
between [the] litigation and the relief ultimately achieved” and
whether the relief awarded “had a basis in law.” Mason, 951
A.2d at 1032 (internal quotation marks omitted). OPRA makes
clear that a records custodian—not a third-party—has the duty

21

to decide whether to allow or deny access to records.16 See N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-5(a), (g). That duty is accompanied by the
burden of paying attorneys’ fees if the custodian wrongly
decides not to disclose records. See Courier News v.
Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 876 A.2d 806, 811 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). To the extent NJIT’s withholding
was involuntary due to the FBI’s directives, such
involuntariness is irrelevant to our inquiry under the statute.
See Spectraserv, Inc., 7 A.3d at 242 (acknowledging that a
third party’s interest does not supersede the records custodian’s
obligation to produce non-exempt documents).

NJIT argues that the FBI was “the de facto custodian
of records relative to plaintiffs’ OPRA requests,” Appellees’
Br. 28, and that it had physical custody of and “absolute
responsibility” for the records, id. at 32. These statements are
irreconcilable both with the facts of this case and New Jersey
law. Williams herself admitted that she is NJIT’s custodian of
records.
NJIT, acting through Williams, also acted
consistently with the role of records custodian: it located the
records, printed the records, reviewed the records, asked the
FBI to review the records, provided the FBI with physical
copies of the records, produced the records after the FBI’s
review, and asserted OPRA exemptions as to the withheld
records. Moreover, OPRA defines a records custodian as an
“officer officially designated by formal action of [a public]
agency’s director or governing body”—a definition that does
not include federal agencies such as the FBI. N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 47:1A-1.1; see also id. (defining “[p]ublic agencies” within
the meaning of OPRA).
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In Courier News, the Superior Court of New Jersey
Appellate Division considered a question similar to that
presented here—whether a records custodian or a third party
with an interest in the disputed records was liable for attorneys’
fees under OPRA. See 876 A.2d at 807–08. In a previous
appeal, the Appellate Division had determined that a tape
recording of a 911 call in the custody of the Hunterdon County
Prosecutor’s Office (the “County”) was subject to disclosure
under OPRA. Id. at 808–09. The Appellate Division
remanded to allow the trial judge to consider an award of
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 809. The County contended that the State
was responsible for attorneys’ fees; it therefore joined the State
as a third-party defendant. Id. at 807, 809. The trial judge
ruled that the State had to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees
because the County “had been performing a state law
enforcement function when it denied plaintiff access to the
tape.” Id. at 808. The Appellate Division disagreed, holding
“that as the custodian of the government record at issue here,
the [County] is responsible under OPRA to pay plaintiff’s
counsel fees.” Id. The Appellate Division relied for its
conclusion on the text of OPRA, which repeatedly discusses
the custodian’s obligation to allow or deny access to records.
Id. at 810. Because “it [was] undisputed that [the County] was
the custodian of the 911 tape,” it was responsible for paying
attorneys’ fees. Id. The Appellate Division “discern[ed] no
legal basis to shift this financial burden to the State.” Id. at
811.
Similarly, in K.L. v. Evesham Township Board of
Education, the father of two elementary school children
invoked OPRA in seeking school records about alleged
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incidents of bullying. 32 A.3d 1136, 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2011). The Board of Education refused to produce
any records, asserting certain exemptions to protect the privacy
of other students. Id. at 1140–41. After the father filed suit,
the trial court ordered the Board to contact the parent of another
child involved in an alleged bullying incident to seek
permission to release the record. Id. at 1141. The other parent
had no objection to the Board’s disclosure of the record,
provided her child’s name was redacted. Id. The Board
therefore released a redacted document that detailed the
disciplining of another student for violent conduct against one
of the father’s children. Id. Notwithstanding the father’s
success in securing the release of the record, the trial court
denied attorneys’ fees under OPRA. Id. at 1142. The
Appellate Division reversed. Id. at 1150. It held that the father
had proven that his lawsuit was the catalyst for disclosure of
the document because “the Board declined to disclose the
document until plaintiff filed his OPRA lawsuit and the court
ordered in camera review.” Id. The father was thereby entitled
to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing plaintiff. Id. at 1151. In that
case, as here, it was not dispositive that a third party had a
confidentiality interest in the disputed document. See id. at
1150–51.
These authorities, taken together, lead us to one
conclusion—it is of no moment that the FBI directed NJIT to
withhold the disputed records. NJIT, as the records custodian,
bore the duty under OPRA to decide whether to release or
withhold the records Golden and Locke sought, as well as the
burden to pay attorneys’ fees if it made the wrong decision. In
making its decision, NJIT was free to consult with the FBI to
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determine whether disclosure would impinge upon any of the
FBI’s interests. See, e.g., Gannett N.J. Partners, LP v. Cty. of
Middlesex, 877 A.2d 330, 335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(instructing records custodians who are not in a position to
assess whether disclosure of a government record would
impact the confidentiality interests of another agency to
consult with “[t]he party with the interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of [the disputed records] and the capacity to
explain the need for that confidentiality”). NJIT did not err by
advising the FBI that its interests may be affected by
production of the documents or by seeking the FBI’s position
as to whether disclosure would be proper. Where NJIT went
astray was in failing to exercise independent judgment and,
instead, unquestioningly obeying the FBI’s orders to withhold
the records. NJIT is responsible for that choice and must bear
the consequences, i.e., paying attorneys’ fees.
C.
In a final attempt to avoid liability, NJIT argues that the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Mason imposed a requirement
of reasonableness on parties in an OPRA dispute. See Mason,
951 A.2d at 1033. According to NJIT, its own actions were
eminently reasonable, thus immunizing it from any obligation
to pay attorneys’ fees.
NJIT’s proffered interpretation of Mason is
unpersuasive.
There, the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that OPRA includes a rebuttable
presumption that attorneys’ fees are warranted whenever a
defendant discloses a record post-lawsuit. Id. at 1032–33. The
Court instead adopted the catalyst theory—that a requestor is
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entitled to attorneys’ fees only if he can demonstrate “a factual
causal nexus between [the] litigation and the relief ultimately
achieved,” and “that the relief ultimately secured . . . had a
basis in law.” Id. at 1032. The Supreme Court explained:
“[t]rial courts would conduct that fact-sensitive inquiry on a
case-by-case basis, evaluating the reasonableness of, and
motivations for, an agency’s decisions, and viewing each
matter on its merits.” Id. at 1033.
The Supreme Court’s reference to “reasonableness” in
Mason is best read in light of its facts. There, the agency had
attempted to work with the requestor to produce records well
before the requestor filed suit. Id. at 1021–22. In the midst of
attempting to fulfill the plaintiff’s record request, the records
custodian was also caring for his critically ill mother, who died
the day before the requestor filed suit. Id. In assessing whether
attorneys’ fees were warranted, the Supreme Court focused on
the reasonableness of the agency’s efforts to produce records
to the requestor: the agency’s immediate response that certain
records were temporarily unavailable, the illness and death of
the records custodian’s mother, and the agency’s production of
some records around the time the requestor filed suit. Id. at
1034. “Because [the agency] had agreed to plaintiff’s request
before she even filed suit, she cannot establish that her lawsuit
entitles her to fees under the catalyst theory.” Id. at 1034–35;
see also Spectraserv, Inc., 7 A.3d at 239, 241–42 (ruling that
the agency’s actions were reasonable—and that attorneys’ fees
were thus unwarranted—due in part to the agency’s pre-suit
attempts to accommodate the requestor’s demands). We thus
conclude that the “reasonableness” language in Mason refers
to the reasonableness of an agency’s efforts to comply with a
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document request before a lawsuit is filed—not whether the
proffered basis for denying access is reasonable. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 47:1A-5(g) (explaining that the custodian must
“attempt[] to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor” if
a request for access “would substantially disrupt agency
operations”).
The plain language of the statute reinforces our
conclusion. OPRA’s attorneys’ fees provision does not include
a reasonableness requirement, except as to the amount of any
fee ultimately awarded. Id. § 47:1A-6 (“A requestor who
prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable
attorney’s fee.” (emphasis added)). By way of contrast,
OPRA’s civil penalty provision does contain an
“unreasonableness” requirement.
See id. § 47:1A-11(a)
(providing for statutory penalties when a custodian “knowingly
and willfully violates [OPRA] . . . and is found to have
unreasonably denied access under the totality of the
circumstances” (emphasis added)). This contrasting language
leads us to conclude that OPRA mandates attorneys’ fees in the
mine run of cases but reserves civil penalties for unreasonable
denials of access. See Smith v. Hudson Cty. Register, 29 A.3d
313, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (rejecting the
agency’s argument that “it is inappropriate here to compel [it]
to pay counsel fees because [it] had been behaving according
to a reasonable interpretation” of OPRA, and, even though the
agency had behaved reasonably, OPRA nonetheless mandated
attorneys’ fees).
Here, the District Court and the Magistrate Judge
incorrectly concluded that, because NJIT had acted reasonably
in following the FBI’s orders, it was absolved of any
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responsibility to pay attorneys’ fees. This interpretation of
reasonableness misreads Mason and conflicts with the plain
language of OPRA. But even if Mason did impose the
“reasonableness” requirement urged by NJIT, its conduct here
was not reasonable. As discussed supra, NJIT—not the FBI—
had the responsibility to parse the requested records, decide
whether exemptions applied, and withhold documents
pursuant to those exemptions. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A5(g). Instead, NJIT followed the FBI’s orders to withhold
thousands of pages of records. In doing so, it exposed itself to
this litigation and the attorneys’ fees that accompany it.17
IV.
The District Court erred in concluding that Golden and
Locke were not prevailing plaintiffs entitled to attorneys’ fees
under OPRA.18 A factual causal nexus exists between Golden
and Locke’s lawsuit and the release of records. We will

The District Court’s Order could be read to suggest
that Golden and Locke should have filed a FOIA request to
obtain the disputed records directly from the FBI. As NJIT
readily admits, Golden and Locke had no obligation to proceed
under FOIA. We therefore reject any argument that Golden
and Locke were required to seek from another agency the
government records within OPRA’s purview.
18
Golden also contends that the District Court erred by
failing to review de novo the Magistrate Judge’s R&R.
Because we are satisfied that the District Court conducted the
required de novo review, we decline to reverse on this ground.
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therefore reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand for
the calculation of an appropriate fee award.
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